The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Beaird v. United States, No. 25‑5343, agreeing to resolve in its next term a long‑standing and consequential question in federal sentencing law: whether Stinson v. United States (1993) still correctly states the level of deference courts must give to the commentary to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).
Why This Matters
The Supreme Court's decision to review Beaird v. United States is likely to have particular significance for white collar defendants, whose advisory sentencing ranges often depend less on the bare guideline text than on expansive interpretations contained in the Sentencing Guidelines commentary. White collar Guidelines are uniquely sensitive to interpretive choices because they are loss‑driven and enhancement‑heavy. Small differences in how loss is defined or calculated – issues often addressed only in commentary – can dramatically affect advisory ranges.
In fraud, securities, corruption, and financial‑crime cases, commentary commonly supplies the operative definitions, aggregation rules, and enhancements that drive offense‑level calculations, especially those involving loss, intended loss, a number of victims, sophisticated means, and role adjustments. As a result, commentary frequently plays a decisive role in increasing advisory ranges, sometimes by many years, even though the underlying conduct is addressed only generally in the Guideline itself.
If the Court curtails deference to commentary that goes beyond interpreting ambiguous Guideline text, white collar defendants may see meaningful changes in how sentencing exposure is calculated. Courts may be less willing to apply commentary‑based rules that broaden loss definitions, permit sweeping aggregation across schemes or time periods, or add enhancements untethered from the Guideline's text. In practical terms, Beaird could strengthen textual challenges at sentencing, narrow the application of enhancement‑heavy provisions, and reduce disparities in outcomes across jurisdictions.
Background: Stinson Deference and the Sentencing Guidelines
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and play a central role in federal sentencing. Although the Guidelines are advisory, district courts are required to correctly calculate a defendant's Guidelines range and give it serious consideration in imposing a sentence. Additionally, while the Guideline text sets forth the formal sentencing rules, the accompanying commentary often supplies the operative definitions and application principles that determine how those rules are applied in practice.
In Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Commission's commentary interpreting the Guidelines is binding unless it is plainly erroneous, inconsistent with the Guideline text, or violates the Constitution or a federal statute. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on principles of administrative deference derived from Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (1945).
For decades, Stinson has led courts to treat Guidelines commentary as effectively authoritative, even when the commentary appears to expand or supplement the Guideline text itself.
Booker, Kisor, and Loper Bright: The Evolving Framework for Deference
When the Supreme Court decided Stinson v. United States in 1993, the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, and both Guideline text and commentary together defined legally binding sentencing rules. That framework changed in United States v. Booker (2005), which held that the mandatory Guidelines regime violated the Sixth Amendment and rendered the Guidelines advisory. Although sentencing courts must still correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, they now retain discretion to vary under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This shift has prompted renewed questions about whether Stinson – developed in an era of binding Guidelines – should continue to govern the degree of deference afforded to commentary that can materially increase a defendant's advisory sentencing range without undergoing the procedural safeguards applicable to Guideline text.
Those questions have taken on added force as the Supreme Court has narrowed and, in some contexts, rejected longstanding doctrines of administrative deference. In Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), the Court sharply limited deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, requiring courts to exhaust traditional tools of interpretation and find genuine ambiguity before affording any deference. That reassessment deepened after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), which overruled Chevron deference and reaffirmed the judiciary’s duty to independently interpret governing legal texts. Together, Booker, Kisor, and Loper Bright frame Beaird as part of a broader doctrinal movement away from automatic deference and toward textual primacy – raising the prospect that sentencing courts, particularly in white collar cases where commentary often drives loss calculations and enhancements, may be required to evaluate Guidelines commentary with substantially greater rigor going forward.
The Circuit Split
The courts of appeals are divided on whether Stinson still requires judges to follow the Sentencing Guidelines commentary.
Some circuits have held that Stinson remains binding.1 They point to the Sentencing Commission's unique role within the judicial branch and emphasize that the Guidelines commentary is an important vehicle for the Commission to fulfill its mandate to promote certainty and fairness in sentencing. In their view, commentary that explains Guideline text remains authoritative unless it directly conflicts with the text.
Other circuits have taken a different approach.2 They reason that once the Guidelines became advisory, automatic deference to commentary was no longer justified, and that Kisor requires courts to defer only when the Guideline text is genuinely ambiguous. Under that view, commentary deserves respect only to the extent it interprets existing text and must be disregarded if it adds new rules, broadens definitions, or increases sentencing exposure without clear support in the Guideline itself. This disagreement – particularly consequential in enhancement and loss‑driven cases – set the stage for Supreme Court review in Beaird.
What's Next
Beaird will be argued during the Supreme Court's October 2026 Term, with a decision expected by June 2027. We will continue to monitor developments and assess the implications for pending cases and future sentencing proceedings. Baker Donelson attorneys are actively monitoring developments in this area. For questions or more information about this issue, please contact a member of the Firm's Government Enforcement & Investigations Group.
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1 United States v. Moses, 23 F.4th 347 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795 (10th Cir. 2023).
2 United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th 648 (9th Cir. 2023); United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023).